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Abstract
We analyse the two definitions of generalized quantifiers for logics of
dependence and independence that have been proposed by F. Engstro¨m,
comparing them with a more general, higher-order definition of team
quantifier. We show that Engstro¨m’s definitions (and other quantifiers
from the literature) can be identified, by means of appropriate lifts, with
special classes of team quantifiers. We point out that the new team quanti-
fiers express a quantitative and a qualitative component, while Engstro¨m’s
quantifiers only range over the latter. We further argue that Engstro¨m’s
definitions are just embeddings of the first-order generalized quantifiers
into team semantics, and fail to capture an adequate notion of team-
theoretical generalized quantifier, save for the special cases in which the
quantifiers are applied to flat formulas. We also raise several doubts con-
cerning the meaningfulness of the monotone/nonmonotone distinction in
this context. In the appendix we develop some proof theory for Engstro¨m’s
quantifiers.
This is the manuscript accepted for publication by the Review of Symbolic
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1 Introduction
Languages of imperfect information are a family of logical formalisms which
allow the semantical analysis of notions, such as dependence and independence,
that cannot be captured by classical first-order logic. Stemming from the par-
tially ordered quantifiers of Henkin (1961), logics have been developed which
express in full generality functional dependence: Independence-Friendly logic
(Hintikka & Sandu, 1989; Mann et al., 2011) and Dependence logic (Va¨a¨na¨nen,
2007). Following similar approaches, newer logical languages were introduced
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which extend first-order logic with other notions of (in)dependence, such as
database dependencies (Gra¨del & Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2013; Galliani, 2012), probabilis-
tic independence (Durand et al., 2016), quantum probabilities (Hyttinen et al.,
2015) and causal dependence (Barbero & Sandu, 2018).
Earlier presentations of these logics ground the semantics on intuitions re-
lated to Skolemization (Sandu, 1993) or to semantic games (Hintikka & Sandu,
1989); however, the unifying background of many of the recent developments in
the field is instead team semantics (Hodges, 1997a,b; Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007). Team
semantics is a generalization of the Tarski-style, compositional semantics of first-
order logic; according to it, the notion of “satisfaction of a formula by an assign-
ment” is replaced by the notion of “satisfaction of a formula by a team” (a set of
assignments). Within this more general framework, it becomes possible to em-
bed in logical formulas notions that cannot be expressed in first-order logic; new
concepts can be incorporated in the form of atomic formulas, special quantifiers,
or new logical operators. It is in this spirit that Engstro¨m (2012) – followed by
Engstro¨m & Kontinen (2013) and Engstro¨m et al. (2013) – proposed two defi-
nitional schemes for the introduction of generalized quantifiers in Dependence
logic; one scheme for the (upwards) monotone quantifiers, and a more complex
one intended for capturing also the non-monotone case. He also extended his
definitions to slashed and backslashed quantifiers, along the lines, respectively, of
Independence-Friendly (IF ) logic and Dependence-Friendly (DF ) logic. Much
in the same spirit, Sevenster (2014) gave a definition of the “most” quantifier
in the context of Independence-Friendly (IF ) logic.
In the present paper, we will analyze some aspects of this treatment of
generalized quantifiers, focusing on extensions of first-order, IF and DF logic.
We will also present a more general, higher-order notion of team-theoretical
generalized quantifier, and see how the quantifiers of Engstro¨m fit in this more
general scheme.
The plan of the paper is as follows:
1) We will argue that Engstro¨m’s (and Sevenster’s) reading of the generalized
quantifiers is biased by misleading parallels with first-order semantics. Once
a proper, team-semantical, reading of these quantifiers is applied, the need to
restrict Engstro¨m’s (first) definition to the monotone case disappears. Yet, the
class of quantifiers which is captured by this definition in the nonmonotone case
is not the class of (Mostowski’s) first-order non-monotone quantifiers.
2) We will introduce (section 5) a more general definition of generalized quan-
tifier (team quantifiers), illustrate the notion with some examples, compare it
with the so-called second-order generalized quantifiers and show (sections 6 and
7) that Engstro¨m’s first and second definition of generalized quantifiers can be
seen as special cases of this more general notion.
3) We will point out that the second definition of Engstro¨m’s (and the first one,
when restricted to the monotone case) manages to model correctly the first-
order generalized quantifiers, but only when the quantifiers are applied to flat
formulas.
4) We will further defend, with a few arguments and examples, the extension of
Engstro¨m’s first clause beyond the monotone case. Among other things, a) we
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show (in a technical appendix) that many good synctactical properties of IF
logic are preserved when the new quantifiers are added, and we see that mono-
tonicity plays no role in these proofs; b) we investigate (at the end of section
4) which class of Engstro¨m quantifiers preserves the locality property of logics,
concluding that the relevant property in this context is not monotonicity, but
rather union closure.
Section 2 is a glossary of the notations that are used most commonly through-
out the paper; section 3 reviews the syntax and semantics of IF and DF logics;
and section 4 reviews thoroughly Engstro¨m’s quantifiers in their most basic
version.
2 General notation
We summarize here our use of letters and notations. Most of the definitions are
deferred to later sections. The reader can skip this section and refer to it as
needed.
Greek letters denote formulas, with the exception of σ, which is reserved for
signatures.
Small letters (u, v, x, y, z...) denote variables (standing for individuals), while
U, V,W denote finite sets of such variables. The letters i and j are reserved for
indexes.
The letter M denotes a first-order structure, i.e. a pair (dom(M), IM ),
where dom(M) is the domain of the structure (a set), while IM is a function
which assigns appropriate interpretations to the elements of the signature of M
(constant, relation and function symbols). We abuse notation and write M for
dom(M) when there is no risk of ambiguity; in particular, we will often write,
for brevity, ℘(M) instead of ℘(dom(M)) (the power set of the domain of M).
The letters P, S denote either 1) subsets of dom(M)n for some structure M , or
2)(first-order) relation symbols (either in the role of constants or variables); in
this second case, we write PM , SM as abbreviations for IM (P ), IM (S). Follow-
ing a common convention, we sometimes refer to a structure as (M,S1, . . . , Sn)
if we want to emphasize that the domain of the interpretation function of the
structure is the set of relation symbols {S1, . . . , Sn}.
The letter Q, and its variants (Q′, Qi...) are used to denote (global) gener-
alized quantifiers (to be reviewed later in the text), possibly including ∀ and ∃.
The letter R is reserved for generalized quantifiers distinct from ∀ and ∃. The
same letters will be used to denote quantifier symbols in the object language.
Sets of quantifiers are denoted by the italic Q or R. The local quantifiers (rel-
ative to a domain M) corresponding to Q, resp. R, are denoted as QM , resp.
RM . The symbols Qˆ, resp. Rˆ are reserved for global team quantifiers (to be
introduced in section 5) and the corresponding symbols in the object languages;
QˆM,X , resp. RˆM,X denote their local versions (X here denotes a team, to be
defined below). Sets of team quantifiers are denoted by Qˆ or Rˆ.
More generally, throughout the paper we need symbols referring to inviduals
and to first, second and third order relations. These four levels are distinguished
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by using, respectively, small, capital, gothic and capped letters. We summarize
these conventions in a table; notice the special treatment of symbols for local
(Mostowski) quantifiers. (The local team quantifiers that we introduce in this
paper, instead, do not fit well in this table; see section 5 for a discussion of their
location in the type hierarchy.)
Type Member of Variables/constants Local quantifiers
individual dom(M) u, v, x, y, z
first-order ℘(dom(M)) P, S
second-order ℘(℘(dom(M))) P, S QM , RM
third-order ℘(℘(℘(dom(M)))) Pˆ , Sˆ
Notice that what we mean by placing e.g. P in the “first-order” row is that P
is a symbol which is used to denote a first-order set (a member of ℘(dom(M))),
or more generally a relation in ℘(dom(M)n), for some n. Somewhat confusingly,
P is sometimes called in the literature a “second-order variable”; we will prefer
the locution “variable for first-order relations”.
The letters s, s′, t... are reserved for assignments. An assignment s on a
structure M is a function dom(s) → dom(M), where dom(s) is any finite set
of variables. We will use some operations on assignments and relations among
them. Assuming s to be an assignment dom(s)→ dom(M),
• For any a ∈ dom(M) and any variable v, we denote as s(a/v) the assign-
ment of domain dom(s) ∪ {v} given by
(s(a/v))(x) =
{
a if x is v
s(x) if x ∈ dom(s) \ {v}.
• s(a1/v1, . . . , an/vn) stands for s(a1/v1) . . . (an/vn).
• For any set of variables V ⊆ dom(s), we write s↾V for the restriction of s
to V .
• For any variable v ∈ dom(s), we write s−v for the restriction of s to
dom(s) \ {v}.
The letters X,Y, Z are reserved for teams (sets of assignments with a com-
mon domain). The letters F,G,H denote functions having a team as domain.
We will use different notations for different notions of extension by general-
ized quantifier. If L is a language and Q a set of quantifiers, LQ will denote the
usual Mostowski extension of L (reviewed in section 4); L(Q) will denote the
extension in the sense of Engstro¨m’s first definition of quantifier (also reviewed
in section 4); extensions according to Engstro¨m’s second definition will be de-
noted as Lb(Q). L[Qˆ] will denote an extension by team quantifiers, according
to the semantics we introduce in section 5 If Q = {Q} (resp. Qˆ = {Qˆ}) is a
singleton, we simply write LQ, L(Q), Lb(Q) (resp. L[Qˆ]), omitting the curly
braces.
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The symbols [ψ]~vM,s, [ψ]
~v
M,X , [ψ]
~v,V
M,X , |ψ|
~v
M will denote various notions of
“meaning” of the formula ψ relative to a few parameters. All these notions are
introduced in section 5
3 Syntax and semantics of IF , IF ∗ and DF logics
We summarize here the syntax and the team semantics of IF logic. A justi-
fication for the semantical rules could be given in terms of a game-theoretical
semantics; the interested reader may consult Mann et al. (2011).
The syntax of IF formulas is similar to that of first-order logic: given a
signature σ, we define σ-terms and atomic formulas as for first-order logic, and
the formulas of IF (σ) are given by following clauses:
α | ¬α | ψ ∧ χ | ψ ∨ χ | (∃v/V )ψ | (∀v/V )ψ
where v is a variable, V a finite set of variables, ψ and χ are IF (σ) formulas,
and α is an atomic formula of signature σ. In the following, we will usually omit
reference to the signature.
The set V occurring in (∃v/V ) or (∀v/V ) is called the slash set of the
quantifier. For brevity, we will write ∃v and ∀v for the quantifiers (∃v/∅) and
(∀v/∅) which have empty slash set. A formula whose quantifiers all have empty
slash set will be said to be first-order.
The set of free variables of a formula ψ, FV (ψ), should be defined with care,
so as to include also those variables from slash sets that do not fall in the scope
of quantification over the same variable. The following inductive clauses do the
job:
• For α atomic IF formula, FV (α) = FV (¬α) is the set of all the variables
that occur in α.
• FV (ψ ∧ χ) = FV (ψ ∨ χ) = FV (ψ) ∪ FV (χ).
• FV ((∃v/V )ψ) = FV ((∀v/V )ψ) = (FV (ψ) \ {v}) ∪ V .
A variable which is not free in a formula is said to be bound. So, for example,
the IF formula ∃z(∃y/{x})R(y, z) has exactly one free variable, x, in spite of
the fact that x does not occur in the atomic part of the formula; z and y are
bound.
As usual, if FV (ϕ) = ∅, ϕ is called a sentence.
Now we move to team semantics. Given a finite set of variables V and
a structure M , a team X of domain V on M is a set of assignments V →
dom(M). We will denote the domain V as dom(X). We can lift many notational
conventions (as they were fixed in section 2) from the level of assignments to
teams:
• For any set of variables V ⊆ dom(X), we write X↾V := {s↾V | s ∈ X}.
• For any variable v ∈ dom(X), we write X−v := {s−v | s ∈ X}.
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• Given a team X and a sequence v1, . . . , vn of variables in dom(X), we can
define an associated n-ary relationX(v1, . . . , vn) := {(s(v1), . . . , s(vn)) | s ∈
X}.
The following operators on teams correspond, respectively, to universal and
existential quantification:
• Given a team X on a structure M , and a variable v, the duplicated
team X [M/v] is defined as the team {s(a/v) | s ∈ X, a ∈ dom(M)}.
• Given a team X over a structure M , a variable v and a function F :
X → ℘(M), the supplemented team X [F/v] is defined as the team
{s(a/v) | s ∈ X, a ∈ F (s)}. More generally, for a sequence of vari-
ables ~v = v1, . . . vn and F : X → ℘(Mn), we can define X [F/~v] =
{s(a1, . . . , an/v1, . . . , vn) | s ∈ X, (a1, . . . , an) ∈ F (s)}.
Finally, we need some machinery in order to take care of statements of
independence among quantifiers.
• Given two assignments s, s′ with the same domain, and a set of variables
V , we say that s and s′ are V -equivalent, and we write s ∼V s′, if
s(x) = s′(x) for all variables x ∈ dom(s) \ V .
• Given a team X , a structure M and a set V of variables, a function
F : X → ℘(M) is V -uniform if, for all s, s′ ∈ X , s ∼V s′ implies
F (s) = F (s′).
We can now define the team semantics of IF logic, which can be thought of
as a ternary relation M,X |= ϕ between a structure M , a team X and an IF
formula ϕ (“in M , ϕ is satisfied by the team X”). We assume that the reader
is familiar with the Tarskian notion of satisfaction (of a quantifier-free formula)
by an assignment, symbolized here as M, s |= ϕ. We shall say that a team is
suitable for an IF formula ψ provided that dom(X) ⊇ FV (ψ).
Definition 3.1. We say that a suitable team X satisfies an IF formula ψ over
a structure M , and we write M,X |= ψ, according to the following clauses:
• M,X |= R(t1, . . . , tn) if M, s |= R(t1, . . . , tn) in the Tarskian sense for
every s ∈ X.
• M,X |= ¬R(t1, . . . , tn) if M, s |= ¬R(t1, . . . , tn) in the Tarskian sense for
every s ∈ X.
• M,X |= t1 = t2 if M, s |= t1 = t2 in the Tarskian sense for every s ∈ X.
• M,X |= t1 6= t2 if M, s |= t1 6= t2 in the Tarskian sense for every s ∈ X.
• M,X |= χ1 ∧ χ2 if M,X |= χ1 and M,X |= χ2.
• M,X |= χ1 ∨ χ2 if there are Y, Z ⊆ X such that Y ∪ Z = X, M,Y |= χ1,
and M,Z |= χ2.
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• M,X |= (∀v/V )χ if M,X [M/v] |= χ.
• M,X |= (∃v/V )χ if M,X [F/v] |= χ for some V -uniform function F :
X → ℘(M) \ {∅}.1
Then one can say that a sentence ϕ is true in M (M |= ϕ) if M, {∅} |= ϕ.
Two IF formulas ψ, χ are truth-equivalent if, for every structureM and every
team X on M , M,X |= ψ if and only if M,X |= χ.
It is to be remarked that, if we omit the requirement of V -uniformity from
the existential case, the above clauses define a semantics for first-order (FO)
logic, which turns out to be equivalent, at the level of sentences, with the usual
Tarskian semantics.2
Some of the arguments in the paper will be more easily stated in terms of
Dependence-Friendly (DF ) logic; this language has, instead of slashed quanti-
fiers, backslashed ones; the quantifier (∃v\V ) is interpreted as “there exists a v
dependent only on V ”. The definition of sets of free variables is analogous to
the case of IF logic. The semantical clauses for backslashed quantifiers are:
• M,X |= (∀v\V )χ if M,X [M/v] |= χ.
• M,X |= (∃v\V )χ if M,X [F/v] |= χ for some (dom(X) \V )-uniform func-
tion F : X → ℘(M) \ {∅}.
Via an appropriate embedding3, also DF logic can be seen as a conservative
extension of FO. We are interested in this language because (differently from
IF ) it shares with FO a property called locality, which will be discussed at the
end of the next section.
Finally, we must recall that, according to team semantics, a formula ψ (of
IF , DF , etc.) is said to be flat if it satisfies the following condition, for all
suitable structures M and teams X :
M,X |= ψ ⇔ (for all s ∈ X , M, {s} |= ψ).
All first-order formulas are flat; so, flat formulas may be thought of as formulas
that behave similarly to first-order ones.
1The clause given here for existential quantification is not the most commonly used in the
literature on IF logic. Typical presentations, such as Mann et al. (2011), include a so-called
strict condition, where the function F is a function X → dom(M), picking elements rather
than sets. Engstro¨m (2012) introduced this lax version of the clause for existential quanti-
fiers, which we follow here, and which turns out to be more appropriate for the inclusion of
generalized quantifiers. For basic IF logic, the strict and lax conditions give rise to equivalent
semantics. More generally, the strict and lax clause are interchangeable for any downward
closed logic; downward closure is the property expressed in Theorem 4.2 below.
2For singleton teams, the equivalence extends to all FO formulas, in the sense that
M, {s} |= ψ iff M, s |= ψ, for every structure M .
3The idea, which is somewhat more awkward than in the case of IF logic, is to identify
a backslashed quantifier (Qv/V ) with the first-order Qv in case (Qv/V ) only occurs in the
scope of quantifications of variables from V .
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4 Engstro¨m quantifiers
We now present the generalized quantifiers for IF logic that were introduced
in Engstro¨m (2012). Given that Engstrm’s definition draws on earlier work
by Mostowski (1957) and Lindstro¨m (1966), we shall start by shortly reviewing
their definition. FollowingMostowski and Lindstro¨m we can call global quantifier
of type (n) any class Q of structures of the form (M,S), with S a n-ary relation
symbol. More general quantifiers (of type (n1, ..., nk)) are considered in the
literature, but we shall not concern us with them here.
Given a global quantifier Q of type (n), one can associate to each domain4
M its local quantifier QM := {S | (M,S) ∈ Q}; notice that this is a set of k-ary
relations, i.e. an element of ℘(℘(Mn)).
Often some restrictions are imposed on the classes of structures which can be
considered global quantifiers; the most important of these being closure under
isomorphisms. Two properties that will be of some importance in our paper
are:
• (Upwards) monotonicity: for allM , if A ∈ QM and A ⊆ B, then B ∈ QM .
• Union closure: for all M , if ∅ 6= A ⊆ QM , then
⋃
A ∈ QM .
A monotone quantifier is also union closed, but the converse may fail; that is
the case, for example, if QM is any singleton different from {M}.
These generalized quantifiers can be “added” to first-order logic by allowing
synctactical expressions of the form Qv1...vnψ; in the style of Mostowski, these
are interpreted by the semantical clause:
• M, s |= Qv1...vnψ if {(a1, . . . , an) | M, s(a1/v1, . . . , an/vn) |= ψ} ∈ QM . 5
When Q is a set of generalized quantifiers, we will let FOQ denote the
extension of first-order logic with the quantifiers in Q (interpreted by the clause
above).
Notably, the type (1) local quantifiers ∀M = {M} and ∃M = ℘(M) \ {∅},
combined with this semantical clause, provide alternative, equivalent definitions
of the universal and existential quantifiers.
We now return to Engstrm’s notion of generalized quantifier. It combines
the idea of a local quantifier described above with the clause for the existential
quantifier in team semantics described in Definition 3.2. For quantifiers of type
(1), this amounts to the following clause:
• M,X |= (Qv/V )ψ if there is a V -uniform function F : X → QM s. t.
M,X [F/v] |= ψ.
We remark that the clause might be easily extended to type (n) generalized
quantifiers of the form (Qv1 . . . vn/V1, . . . , Vn), but the type (1) quantifiers will
4Remember our convention of writing M either for structures or their domains, according
to convenience.
5More precisely, in this context we should write Qdom(M).
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mostly suffice for the arguments of this paper. Notice that by applying this
clause to the local quantifiers ∀M and ∃M one obtains precisely the team se-
mantics clauses for the universal and existential quantifiers.
Let Q be a set of quantifiers. We consider extensions FO(Q) and IF (Q)
of, respectively, FO and IF , in which the quantifiers Q are interpreted by
Engstro¨m’s semantical clause.
Example 4.1. Consider the local quantifier ∃M≥3 := {S ⊆ dom(M) | card(S) ≥
3}. Let us evaluate the sentence ∀x∃≥3yP (x, y) on a structure M : M |=
∀x∃≥3yP (x, y) iff M, {∅} |= ∀x∃≥3yP (x, y) iff M, {∅}[M/x] |= ∃≥3yP (x, y)
iff there is a function F : {∅}[M/x] → ∃M≥3 such that M, {∅}[M/x][F/y] |=
P (x, y) (we can also write {∅}[MF/xy] for {∅}[M/x][F/y]). This last condition
amounts to saying, as in the case of the corresponding Mostowski quantifier6,
that for each possible value of x there are at least 3 values for y which stand in
the relation P with this value of x. If we write ∀x(∃≥3y/{x})P (x, y), we are
adding the further requirement that we can pick the same 3 values of y for each
value of x. Of course, the same can be achieved using the FO(∃≥3) sentence
∃≥3y∀xP (x, y).
But IF (Q) sentences cannot always be reduced to FO(Q) by means of quan-
tifier swapping or other tricks; for example, in Sevenster (2014) it is shown that
there are sentences of the form mostx(mosty/{x})ψ (where mostM = {S ⊆
M | card(S) ≥ card(M)/2} for M finite structure) which have no equivalent in
FO(most).
A different kind of example is given by the quantifier ∃M=3 := {S ⊆ dom(M) | card(S) =
3}. Here it is immediately evident that the interpretation given by the clause of
Engstro¨m is not the Mostowskian one (“there are exactly three”). For exam-
ple, the sentence ∃=3xP (x) is true on a structure M iff there are at least three
elements that satisfy P ; indeed, the existence of an appropriate supplementing
function which picks n ≥ 3 elements entails the existence of an appropriate
function which picks exactly three elements. In this context, it seems to us to be
more reasonable to read this quantifier as “there is a 3-element set”, or, more
generally, “there is a supplementing function which picks 3-element sets”.
Contrarily to what we stated above for IF logic, the restriction of the
team semantics of IF (Q) to its first-order fragment FO(Q) is not equivalent
to Tarskian semantics plus the Mostowski-Lindstro¨m definition of the gener-
alized quantifiers. This kind of conservativity may fail for the nonmonotone
quantifiers; this claim will be substantiated in the next sections. It is probably
this the reason why Engstro¨m required that his definition be applied only to
monotone quantifiers. However, throughout the paper we will illustrate that
many good properties of Engstro¨m’s semantical clause hold as well if the def-
inition is applied to non-monotone quantifiers (see the rest of the section, but
also in particular the Appendix), and that there are other reasons that make
the restriction to the monotone case not too well justified.
6We will see that this correspondence fails if a quantifier like ∃≥3 is applied to a more
complex, non-flat formula.
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We see that the IF (Q) languages all satisfy two fundamental properties of
IF logic.
Theorem 4.2 (Downward closure). Given a formula ψ of IF (Q) such that
M,X |= ψ, for all Y ⊆ X it holds that M,Y |= ψ.
Proof. We give this proof for completeness, since the analogous result of Engstro¨m
(2012) is stated to hold only under the assumption of monotonicity of the quan-
tifiers. We prove the statement by induction on the structure of ϕ. For IF op-
erators, see the analogous proof for Dependence logic in Va¨a¨na¨nen (2007), 5.1.
The only new case is ϕ = (Qv/V )ψ, for Q ∈ Q. Suppose M,X |= (Qv/V )ψ.
Then there is a V -uniform function F : X → QM such that M,X [F/v] |= ψ.
Let Z = {s ∈ X [F/v] | s−v ∈ Y }. By induction hypothesis, M,Z |= ψ. Let G
be the restriction of F to Y ; clearly it is a V -uniform function Y → QM . Then
Z = Y [G/v]. So, M,Y |= (Qv/V )ψ. All steps are correct also in the limit case
that X [F/v] = ∅.
Theorem 4.3 (Empty team property). Every formula ψ of IF (Q) is satisfied
by the empty team, on any structure (M, ∅ |= ψ).
Proof. By induction on the syntax of ψ.
It is straightforward to show that also the languages DF (Q) have the down-
ward closure and the empty team property. But they have an additional prop-
erty, locality (i.e. context independence), which is described in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.4 (Locality). Let ϕ be a DF (Q) formula, and X a team suitable
for ϕ. Then, for all structures M ,
M,X |= ϕ ⇐⇒ M,X↾FV (ϕ) |= ϕ
Proof. The proof is by induction on the syntax of ϕ; it will be easier to prove
the seemingly stronger claim that, for each U ⊇ FV (ϕ),
M,X |= ϕ ⇐⇒ M,X↾U |= ϕ.
The cases for (possibly negated) atoms, ∧ and ∨ are adequately treated in
Va¨a¨na¨nen (2007), proof of Lemma 3.27. We consider the quantifier case, ϕ =
(Qv\V )ψ. 7 Let W := U ∪ {v}.
⇒) Assume M,X |= (Qv\V )ψ. Then there is a (dom(X) \ V )-uniform
function F : X → QM such that M,X [F/v] |= ψ. By the inductive hypothesis,
M,X [F/v]↾W |= ψ. Now define F ∗ : X↾U → QM as follows. For each s ∈
X↾U , pick an s
′ ∈ X such that s = s′↾U . Then let F
∗(s) := F (s′); clearly
F ∗ is (dom(X) \ V )-uniform. Since dom(X↾U ) \ V ⊆ dom(X) \ V , F ∗ is also
(dom(X↾U ) \ V )-uniform. It can be checked that X↾U [F ∗/v] ⊆ X [F/v]↾W . So,
by downward closure, M,X↾U [F
∗/v] |= ψ. Therefore M,X↾U |= (Qv\V )ψ.
7This case takes care also of the existential quantifier, thanks to our initial choice of the
lax semantics.
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⇐) Assume M,X↾U |= (Qv\V )ψ. Then there is a (dom(X↾U ) \ V )-uniform
function G : X↾U → QM such that M,X↾U [G/v] |= ψ. Define G∗ : X → QM
by the clause G∗(s) := G(s↾U ); G
∗ is (dom(X↾U ) \ V )-uniform. It can then be
checked that X [G∗/v]↾W = X↾U [G/v]; soM,X [G
∗/v]↾W |= ψ. By the inductive
hypothesis, M,X [G∗/v] |= ψ. So M,X |= (Qv\V )ψ.
In Engstro¨m & Kontinen (2013) the same result is stated (without proof) for
Dependence logic; but the authors restrict its validity to extensions by mono-
tone quantifiers. The proof above shows that this restriction is unnecessary.
Notice however that downward closure was needed in the proof. Suppose we
try to extend with Engstro¨m quantifiers some language which is local, but not
downward closed8; we might then need some restrictive assumptions on the ad-
ditional quantifiers. A different argument for proving locality, which was given
in Galliani (2013) Theorem 4.22, shows that one such sufficient condition is re-
quiring union closure of the quantifiers; i.e., a restriction which is weaker than
monotonicity.
5 Generalized team quantifiers
We want to argue that the methodology for generalized quantifier extensions
proposed by Engstro¨m is not the most adequate for IF , DF and similar logics,
because it does not take into account the second-order nature of the semantics
of these logics. One way of supporting this claim is making the following rough
observation: on one side, the “meaning” (in an extensional sense) of a first-order
formula ψ of n free variables can be identified with the set of all assignments
of domain dom(s) which satisfy ψ.9 Once an alphabetical order of the free
variables of ψ is fixed, say ~v = v1 . . . vn, each such assignment can be identified
with a corresponding tuple s(~v) = (s(v1), . . . , s(vn)). So, the “meaning” of a
FO formula of n free variables is a set of n-tuples, i.e. an n-ary relation. On the
other hand, formulas of team based logics are satisfied by teams. For simplicity,
let us focus on a local logic, such asDF . The “meaning” of aDF formula ψ with
n free variables is the set of all the teams of domain FV (ψ). Assuming again
that the variables of ψ are enumerated as ~v, each team X in the “meaning” of ψ
can be identified with the relation X(~v) := {(s(v1), . . . , s(vn)) | s ∈ X}. So, the
“meaning” of a DF formula is a set of n-ary relations. If variables in team logics
refer to sets and relations, it seems then unreasonable that quantifiers of team
logics be not shifted to a higher order. The typical first-order quantifiers assert
that a formula holds for a quantity of elements. We should expect, then, that
the typical generalized quantifiers for team logics state that a formula holds for
a certain quantity of sets ; and perhaps, as a second dimension, it could express
the size of the sets. Thus, the interpretation QM of a quantifier Q in a structure
8For example, languages which contain the independence atoms of Gra¨del & Va¨a¨na¨nen
(2013), or the inclusion atoms of Galliani (2013).
9In theory, we should consider assignments s such that dom(s) ⊇ FV (ψ), since also these
kinds of assignments can satisfy the formula; but thanks to the locality property of FO, the
assignments with domain FV (ψ) encode all the significant information.
11
M should not be a subset of ℘(M), but a subset of ℘(℘(M)). In an extension
of DF or IF logic, it would seem legitimate to say things like “ψ holds for most
six-element sets”, “there is a set of size smaller than three for which ψ holds”,
“ψ holds on all cofinite sets”, and so on. Quantifiers of this kind appear in the
literature under the name of second-order generalized quantifiers.10
Actually, in the context of team semantics, this is still an oversimplification;
the quantifiers we are after will behave as second-order generalized quantifier
only when they occur sentence-initially. We will be guided to a reasonable
definition by analogy with the first-order case. As we have seen, a local quantifier
QM in the sense of Mostowski is a second-order object – a set of n-ary relations,
if its type is (n). In order to assess whether a FOQ formula ϕ = Qv1 . . . vnψ is
satisfied onM by a given assignment s (of domain dom(s) ⊇ FV (ϕ)), one needs
to take into consideration an object that we may call the meaning of ϕ relative
toM, s and ~v (= v1, . . . , vn): [ϕ]
~v
M,s := {(a1, . . . , an) |M, s(a1/v1, . . . , an/vn) |=
ψ}. If [ϕ]~vM,s ∈ Q
M , then ϕ is satisfied by s in M . This “meaning” encodes all
the ways in which s can be extended so as to satisfy ψ. Notice that [ϕ]~vM,s can
be an element of QM because it is a first-order object, i.e., an (n-ary) relation.
With this in mind, it seems reasonable to introduce a notion of meaning
of ϕ relative to M,X and ~v, where X is a team such that dom(X) ⊇ FV (ϕ).
In analogy with the first-order case, such a “meaning” should encode all the
possible ways in which the team X can be extended over variable v so as to
satisfy formula ψ. But it seems hard to identify a natural notion of “extending
a team by means of a set”; this is the reason why our local quantifiers will not
be the usual second-order quantifiers. Instead, it is reasonable to extend a team
X by extending each assignment of the team with a set (supplementing). This
amounts to picking a function F : X → ℘(dom(M)). Thus, the “meaning” of ψ
relative M,X and v will be a set of supplementing functions:
[ϕ]vM,X = {F : X → ℘(M) | M,X [F/v] |= ψ}. (1)
This object is an element of ℘(℘(M)X) ⊂ ℘(℘(X×℘(M))), i.e., if we ignore the
contribution made by the team, a third-order object. However, the role it will
play is mostly affine to a second-order notion of meaning; for this reason, we
abuse our notation and use gothic variables such as F for these kinds of objects.
In the case of IF logic, we will also need to take care of the fact that each
quantifier can also have a slash set V ; the correct semantical object to consider
in this case seems then to be:
[ϕ]v,VM,X = {F : X → ℘(M) | F is V -uniform and M,X [F/v] |= ψ}. (2)
“Meanings” for DF logic formulas can be devised analogously.
Our local team quantifiers will then have to be sets of such meanings; that
is, elements of ℘(℘(℘(M)X)). Inoring the role of X , these are fourth-order
10Second-order generalized quantifiers were introduced in two slightly different forms in
Burtschick & Vollmer (1998) and Andersson (2002), respectively; significant results on their
definability theory are found e.g. in Kontinen (2010).
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objects, but, again, the part they play is analogous to that of local second-
order quantifiers (which are third order objects). So, abusing again notation,
we will denote them as QˆM,X . Notice that we have a second parameter for the
localization, i.e. a team X ; this is not a strictly necessary step, but it will help
us work, in the following, with simpler notations. A (global) team quantifier
Qˆ might be thought of as a class of local quantifiers indexed by a pair (M,X)
ranging over structure-team pairs (with the obvious restriction that X be a
team on M).
Given a set Qˆ of team quantifiers, we denote by IF [Qˆ] the language IF
extended with the syntactical clause that states that (Qˆv/V )ψ is an IF [Qˆ]
formula, provided that Qˆ ∈ Qˆ, ψ is an IF [Qˆ] formula, v is a variable, and V a
finite set of variables. The corresponding semantical clause, for each Qˆ ∈ Qˆ, is:
• M,X |= (Qˆv/V )ψ if [ψ]v,VM,X ∈ Qˆ
M,X .
The treatment of extensions of DF logic is similar. Extending the definition
to n-ary quantifiers is only a matter of greater notational complexity; unary
quantifiers will suffice for our arguments in the paper.
Notice that, for what regards the special case in which a team quantifier Qˆv
occurs sentence-initially (say, in front of a formula ψ s.t. FV (ψ) = {v}), there
is a bijection between the set ℘(M){∅} of functions F : {∅} → ℘(M) and the
set of sets of the form F (∅) (for some F ∈ ℘(M){∅}). Therefore, the “meaning”
that is used to check the truth of Qˆvψ over a structure M , that is, the set
[ψ]vM,{∅} = {F : {∅} → ℘(M) | M,X [F/v] |= ψ}, can be identified, through
the bijection, with a second-order object, a subset of ℘(M):
|ψ|vM := {F (∅) | F : {∅} → ℘(M) and M,X [F/v] |= ϕ}.
Thus, when evaluating sentence-initial quantifiers, our earlier intuitive state-
ment that the meaning of the subformula ψ is a family of subsets of dom(M)
is somewhat justified. Similarly, in the sentence-initial case the local quantifier
QˆM,{∅} can be identified with a third-order object (an element of ℘(℘(℘(M)))):
|Qˆ|M := {{F (∅) | F ∈ F} | F ∈ QˆM,{∅}};
this is the reason for our choice of sticking to the third-order notation Qˆ. It
is then straightforward to see that the semantical clause can be restated, for
sentence-initial quantifiers and the singleton team {∅}, as
• M, {∅} |= Qˆvψ if |ψ|vM ∈ |Qˆ|
M .
We illustrate the notion of team quantifier (and compare it to previous ap-
proaches) with some examples. But first we wish to point out that also for
team quantifiers there is a notion of (upwards) monotonicity. A quantifier Qˆ
is monotone (in the team-theoretical sense) if, for every domain M and every
F,F′ ∈ ℘(℘(℘(M)X)) (sets of supplementing functions), F ∈ QˆM plus F ⊆ F′
implies F′ ∈ QˆM .
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Example 5.1. Consider the following local team quantifiers:
∃ˆM,X := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)X) | ∃F ∈ F ∩ (℘(M) \ {∅})X}
∀ˆM,X := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)X) | ∃F ∈ F∀s ∈ X(F (s) = dom(M))}
It is straightforward to see that these are nothing else than the usual quantifiers
∃, ∀ of team semantics, in the sense that, for any formula ψ of any language
considered in this paper, any structure M and any team X, and any variable v,
M,X |= ∃ˆvψ ⇐⇒ M,X |= ∃vψ
M,X |= ∀ˆvψ ⇐⇒ M,X |= ∀vψ
(similar statements hold for slashed and backslashed versions of the quantifiers).
However, notice that ∃ˆ and ∀ˆ are both upwards monotone in the team-
theoretical sense. We might say that, from a higher-order perspective, they are
both existential quantifiers (stating the existence of a certain function).
Example 5.2. Let us consider the quantifier “there are exactly three”. There
are at least four distinct ways to represent this kind of quantification by means
of a team quantifier. The first of these is described by the local quantifier
∃ˆM,X=3 := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)
X) | ∃F ∈ F∀s ∈ X(card(F (s)) = 3)}.
If the “meaning” of a formula ψ is in ∃ˆM,X=3 , that means that “there is at least
one function F which picks 3-elements sets”, such that M,X [F/v] |= ψ. This
is equivalent to the Engstro¨m quantifier ∃=3; but it should be clear that, in the
context of team quantifiers, this is a perfectly reasonable quantifier, contrarily to
what was claimed by Engstro¨m (we will return more systematically on this point
in section 6). Notice that, in the team-theoretical sense, this is an (upwards)
monotone quantifier.
The second possible interpretation of “there are exactly three” is the follow-
ing:
∃ˆM,X=3,nm := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)
X) | F 6= ∅ ∧ ∀F ∈ F∀s ∈ X(card(F (s)) = 3)}.
Now M,X |= ∃ˆ=3ψ states that 1) there is at least one function F picking 3-
element sets, such thatM,X [F/v] |= ψ; and 2), that any supplementing function
F which satisfies the condition M,X [F/v] |= ψ is a function which picks 3-
element sets. We will see in section 7 how this quantifier relates to Engstro¨m’s
second definition of generalized quantifier, which is instead instantiated by the
following quantifier:
∃ˆM,X=3,b := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)
X) | ∃F ∈ F[∀s ∈ X(card(F (s)) = 3)∧
∧∀F ′ ≥ F∀s ∈ X(card(F (s)) = 3)]}.
where F ′ ≥ F means that F ′(s) ⊇ F (s) for all s ∈ X.
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The fourth interpretation of “there are exactly three” is the following:
∃ˆM,X
=3ˆ
:= {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)X) | card(F) = 3 and ∀F ∈ F(F 6= ∅)}.
M,X |= ∃ˆ=3ˆψ states the existence of exactly three supplementing functions
F1, F2, F3 such that, for i = 1..3,M,X [Fi/v] |= ψ. The requirement of nonempti-
ness seems to be necessary in order to avoid triviality, since the most typical log-
ics based on team semantics all have the empty team property. This third defini-
tion is close in spirit to the Most quantifier that was introduced in Durand et al.
(2011), and which we review in the next example.
Example 5.3. There has been already at least one proposal of a properly higher-
order, team-theoretical quantifier. Durand et al. (2011) studied a “Most” quan-
tifier defined by the following semantical clause (over finite structures):
M,X |= Most vψ ⇔
⇔ there are at least card(MX)/2 functions X →M s.t. M,X [F/v] |= ψ.
This can be straightforwardly expressed as the semantics of a team quantifier.
Let ℘1(M) denote the set of singleton subsets of dom(M). Then M,X |=
Most vψ if and only if [ψ]vM,X ∈Most
M,X , where
MostM,X := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)X) | card(F ∩ ℘1(M)X) ≥ card(MX)/2)}.
(Notice the slight difference: the functions in the definition of Durand et al.
(2011) pick elements of dom(M), while the functions mentioned in the definition
of MostM,X pick singleton subsets of dom(M).)
Durand et al. (2011) prove that the extension of FO with this Most quantifier
is not local, in the sense of Theorem 4.411 This shows that, when adding team
quantifiers (as defined in this paper) to a local logic, one does not necessarily
obtain a local logic.
We show an example of a team-theoretically nonmonotone quantifier which
seems to be captured correctly by our definition.
Example 5.4. We consider the quantifier “there are finitely many functions
which pick countable sets...”, defined as
∃ˆM<ω,=ω := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)
X) |card(F ∩ ℘ω(M)X) < ω}
where ℘ω(M) denotes the set of countable subsets of dom(M). Consider the
usual structure (N,+,×) of natural numbers, and let P := {S ⊆ N|∀n ∈
S(n is prime)} be the set of all sets of prime numbers. P is downward closed,
in the sense that, if P ∈ P and P ′ ⊆ P , then P ′ ∈ P (this holds because,
since P ′ ⊆ P ∈ P, P ′ is also a set of prime numbers). It is known, by
11The argument for nonlocality is only found in the online archived version of Durand et al.
(2011), arXiv:1109.4750v6. Notice also that in the journal version of the paper, Durand et al.
(2015), the authors give a different definition of Most, which gives rise to local logics.
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Theorem 4.9 of Kontinen & Va¨a¨na¨nen (2009), that each downward closed set
of subsets of the domain of a fixed structure is definable by some IF for-
mula of one free variable. Therefore, there is an IF formula ψ (of one free
variable v) which, on the structure (N,+,×) for Peano arithmetic, is satis-
fied exactly by all sets of prime numbers (it defines P). (More rigorously:
it is satisfied by all teams X of domain {v} such that, for all s ∈ X, s(v)
is a prime number). Then, ψ is satisfied by infinitely many (countable) sets
of prime numbers: we should expect that N 6|= ∃ˆ<ω,=ωxψ. Let us show that
our semantic clause does indeed give the expected answer. Observe that here
[ψ]vM,{∅} = {F : {∅} → ℘(M) | M, {∅}[F/v] |= ψ} = {F : {∅} → ℘(M) | ∀a ∈
F (∅)(a is prime)} = {F : {∅} → ℘(M) | F (∅) ∈ P}. Therefore, card({F ∈
[ψ]vM,{∅} | card(F (∅)) = ω}) = card([ψ]
v
M,{∅}) = card(P) = 2
ℵ0 , while all F
in ∃ˆM<ω,=ω are such that F ∩ ℘
ω(M)X is finite. So, [ψ]vM,{∅} /∈ ∃ˆ
M
<ω,=ω, which
means N 6|= ∃ˆ<ω,=ωvψ, as expected.
It should be obvious at this point that team quantifiers are an extremely
rich family of objects. Perhaps it might be welcome to find some restrictions in
order to tame this wild multiplicity. First of all, in order to avoid a number of
exceptions, for the rest of the paper we assume that, if F ∈ QM,X , then F does
not contain the empty function.
Secondly, one might want to consider only team quantifiers that are, in
some sense, logical. Invariance by permutations and the stricter invariance by
isomorphisms are considered, by many authors, to be necessary conditions for
logicality of Mostowski quantifiers. Peters & Westerst˚ahl (2006), sec. 9.1.1,
describe a recipe for lifting these conditions to objects of higher-order. The key
point is that any bijection g between domainsM,M ′ can be lifted to a bijection
of higher-order objects. In our case, we first need to lift it to a bijection g′
between teams of the same variable domain. Given a team X of domain V , we
define g′(X) as the team {f ◦ s | s ∈ X} (where ◦ is composition of functions).
It is then straightforward to use the recipe of Peters & Westerst˚ahl (2006) to
lift g to a bijection g′′ between sets of supplementing functions (i.e. elements of
℘(℘(M)X), for various X). Then, invariance by permutations states that, for
all M , X as above, all permutations g :M →M , and all F ∈ ℘(℘(M)X),
F ∈ QM,X ⇐⇒ g′′(F) ∈ QM,X .
Invariance by isomorphisms will be the stricter requirement that, for all bijec-
tions g :M →M ′, and all X,F as above,
F ∈ QM,X ⇐⇒ g′′(F) ∈ Qg(M),g
′(X).
Famously (Peters & Westerst˚ahl, 2006, sec. 3.3.2), for type (1) Mostowski quan-
tifiers, isomorphism invariance is equivalent to a condition on cardinalities of
the sets that belong to the (local) quantifiers and their complements. The anal-
ogous condition for team quantifiers reads as follows: for all structures M and
teams X on M ,
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If F ∈ QˆM,X , F′ ∈ ℘(℘(M)X), card(℘(M)X \ F) = card(℘(M)X \
F′) and card(F) = card(F′), then F′ ∈ QˆM,X ;
that is, if two classes F,F′ of supplementing functions contain the same number
of functions, and also their complements (in the set of all appropriate supple-
menting functions) contain the same number of functions, then either both
F,F′ belong to QˆM,X or neither of them does. Differently from the case of
Mostowski quantifiers, this clause is a much stricter restriction than invariance
by isomorphisms: it selects quantifiers which only discriminate sets of supple-
menting functions according to a quantitative component (number of functions)
and not to a qualitative component (kind of functions). The quantifier ∃ˆM,X
=3ˆ
based on Durand et al. (2011) is purely quantitative and satisfies this clause12,
but the team quantifier ∃ˆM,X=3 , based on Engstro¨m’s notion of quantifier, does
not. More generally, we will see in the next section that each Engstro¨m quan-
tifier Q can be identified with a team quantifier Eˆ(Q); save for trivial cases,
no quantifier of the form Eˆ(Q) satisfies our condition on cardinalities, although
many quantifiers of this form are isomorphism invariant. These quantifiers all
express the same quantitative component (“There exists a function”) but differ
for quality. Also the quantifier ∃ˆ<ω,=ω is not accepted. Here “There are finitely
many functions” is the quantity, while “picking countable sets” is the quality.
We might try to formulate a condition on cardinalities which is not so re-
strictive, and vindicates the role of “qualities”. The idea is that the conditions
on cardinality should be imposed only on families of functions that fall within
the “quality” of the quantifier. We thus need a precise definition of what the
“quality” of a quantifier is. We suggest the following: for each structure M and
teamX onM , let q(Qˆ,M,X) :=
⋃
QˆM,X = {F ∈ ℘(M)X |∃F ∈ QˆM,X(F ∈ F)}
(the set of all functions that occur in some family of QˆM,X). Then we decide to
accept as (local) team quantifiers only the families QˆM,X ∈ ℘(℘(℘(M)X)) such
that
If F ∈ QˆM,X , F′ ⊆ q(Qˆ,M,X), card(℘(M)X \F) = card(℘(M)X \
F′) and card(F) = card(F′), then F′ ∈ QˆM,X .
This condition is sufficient to exclude some bizarre quantifiers as “There are
k functions which pick sets of cardinality k, for some k” (in which quantity
and quality are interdependent), while, for example, tolerating the quantifier
∃ˆ<ω,=ω that we discussed above. If the quantifier Qˆ is not invariant under
isomorphism, it seems reasonable to make our clause stricter by redefining the
notion of “quality”: we do not want simply to take it to be
⋃
QˆM,X , but also
require it to be closed under isomorphisms (lifted to the level of functions F ∈
℘(M)X).
12Here we are using our nontriviality assumption, that F ∈ ∃ˆM,X
=3ˆ
entails ∅ /∈ F.
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6 Interpreting Engstro¨m’s quantifiers
We want now to interpret and locate more clearly the generalized quantifiers
of Engstro¨m (as reviewed in section 4) within the framework for generalized
team quantifiers that we introduced in section 5 In particular, we want to un-
derstand to what extent Engstro¨m’s proviso that his definition be applied only
to monotone quantifiers is justified.
Concerning this last point, Engstro¨m only offers an example in defense of
this restriction:
(...) This applies even for non-monotone quantifiers but for those
quantifiers Q the truth condition above does not make a whole lot
of sense as the following example shows. Let M = N and Q = {A}
where A is the set of even numbers. According to the truth condition
above M, {∅} |= Qx(x = x) since there is a team X = A(x) such
that M,X |= x = x. (Engstro¨m, 2012, sec. 2; we slightly changed
the notation)
Engstro¨m does not provide any explanation why the quantifier in this exam-
ple seems to him to be treated incorrectly. Our guess is that, in analogy with
the semantic clause of Mostowski, he expects a sentence Qxψ to be satisfied if
and only if the set of elements which satisfy ψ is exactly A. This is not the case
in the example, for x = x is satisfied by all elements of N. So, it seems that the
worries of Engstro¨m are driven by the desire to obtain conservative extensions
over logics which accomodate Mostowski quantifiers. Such a conservative exten-
sion result has been proved for sentences of Mostowski extensions of first-order
logic (Engstro¨m, 2012, Proposition 2.4.4) and then generalized to an embedding
of Mostowski extensions of existential second-order logic13 into corresponding
extensions of Dependence logic (Engstro¨m & Kontinen, 2013). The following
example shows in what way the interpretation of Engstro¨m quantifiers is de-
viant, over open formulas, with respect to Mostowski quantifiers, and compares
it to the interpretation via team quantifiers (as defined in the previous section).
Example 6.1. Let us consider the sentence θ : ∀x∃=3yP (x, y), which can be
seen both as a (generalized) first-order sentence and as a (generalized) IF sen-
tence. According to first-order semantics and Mostowski’s definition,
M |= ∀x∃=3yP (x, y)⇔ for all s s.t. dom(s) = {x},M, s |= ∃=3yP (x, y)
⇔ for all s s.t. dom(s) = {x}, {a ∈M | M, s(a/y) |= P (x, y)} ∈ ∃M=3.
This is not the usual notion of supplementing (and Engstro¨m’s definition for the
non-monotone cases is probably intended to bridge this gap). Instead, the team
semantics of the universal quantifier, plus Engstro¨m’s semantics for generalized
quantifiers, yields:
M |= ∀x∃=3yP (x, y)⇔M, {∅}[M/x] |= ∃=3yP (x, y)
13In line with our earlier conventions, we might denote such extensions as ESOQ. The
notation used in Engstro¨m & Kontinen (2013) was ESO(Q).
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⇔ there is a function F : {∅}[M/x]→ ∃M=3 s.t. M,X [MF/xy] |= P (x, y).
This is a different meaning; it states that for all assignments s s.t. dom(s) =
{x}, and for a specific function F , it holds that {F (s) |M, s(F (s)/y) |= P (x, y)} ∈
∃M=3. This is a weaker condition; it does not require that the set [θ]M,s of all
a ∈ M such that s(a/y) satisfies P to be an element of ∃M=3; but only that, for
each s, we can pick a subset of [θ]M,s that falls in ∃
M
=3 (and whose assignments
all satisfy P (x, y)). So, under team semantics, the very same sentence is true
in more models than in the first-order case.
Remember from example 5.2 that formulas of the form ∃=3ψ are in general
equivalent to team quantifier expressions of the form ∃ˆ=3ψ. The fact that the
quantifier ∃ˆ=3 can also be expressed in terms of the first-order local quantifier
∃M=3 (similarly to what happened for ∃ˆ, ∀ˆ) is a peculiar accident, which plausibly
does not apply to most team quantifiers. But we will see that each Engstro¨m
quantifier (irrespectively of monotonicity properties) has a corresponding team
quantifier. Before that, let us add some further remarks on the example of
Engstro¨m that was quoted at the beginning of the section. One fishy aspect
of this example is that it discusses an FO(Q) extension; in particular, one key
element in Engstro¨m’s argument seems to be the fact that x = x is a flat formula,
so that it makes sense to say that it is satisfied by this or that number. As we
have seen in the previous section, in the more general context of team semantics,
if a formula is not flat it makes no sense to say it is satisfied by an element of the
domain (resp. a tuple of elements). It is not a surprise, then, that the above-
mentioned conservativity results only hold at the level of sentences.14 Notice
that the example is perfectly meaningful if we read the quantifier Q in a second-
order fashion (which is justified, since the quantifier occurs sentence-initially –
see the remarks in the previous section). Under this reading, the sentence
Qx(x = x) in the example states that “there is a set, containing exactly the
even numbers, which satisfies x = x”; it is then reasonable that Qx(x = x) be
true in N since the set of even numbers (or, more precisely, the corresponding
team X = {{(x, 2n)} | n ∈ N}) does satisfy x = x. Within this reading of
the quantifiers, using the rough analysis of the previous sections, “there exists”
is the quantity, while “containing exactly the even numbers” is the quality of
the quantifier. Underlying these observations is the claim that all the Engstro¨m
quantifiers can be thought, instead, as existential second-order quantifiers (their
“quantity” is just the statement of the existence of a nonempty set). This claim
can be stated in a more general form and proved:
Theorem 6.2. Let Q be a Mostowski quantifier, and consider the second-order
quantifier Eˆ(Q) (for brevity: Qˆ) given by the condition, for all domains M and
teams X:
QˆM,X := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)X) | ∃F ∈ F∀s ∈ X(F (s) ∈ QM )}
14It is instead surprising that such a conservativity result does hold at the level of
open formulas, if one considers quantifier extensions of the so-called Independence logic I
(Engstro¨m & Kontinen, 2013, Theorem 4.1). Yet the correspondence is still imperfect in
some ways; most notably, the FOQ fragment of ESOQ does not translate into the FO(Q)
fragment of I(Q).
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Then, for every structure M , team X and ψ IF (Q ∪ {Q}) formula,
M,X |= ψ ⇐⇒ M,X |= ψ∗
where ψ∗ is the IF (Q)[Qˆ] formula obtained from ψ by replacing all occurrences
of Q with Qˆ. The same statement holds for extensions of DF logic, or for
formulas with occurrences of both slashed and backslashed quantifiers.
Proof. By induction on the syntax of ψ; the only nontrivial case is ψ = (Qv/V )χ
(the case ψ = (Qv\V )χ is analogous).
Suppose M,X |= ψ. Then there is a V -uniform function F : X → QM s.
t. M,X [F/v] |= χ. By the inductive assumption, M,X [F/v] |= χ∗ So, F ∈
[χ∗]v,VM,X . So [χ
∗]v,VM,X ∈ Qˆ
M,X . Therefore M,X |= (Qˆv/V )χ∗, i.e., M,X |= ψ∗.
Vice versa, assume M,X |= (Qˆv/V )χ∗. This means that [χ∗]v,VM,X ∈ Qˆ
M,X .
But then there is a function F ∈ [χ∗]v,VM,X such that F (s) ∈ Q
M for each s ∈ X ;
this latter condition states that (1): F is a function X → QM . F being an
element of [χ∗]v,VM,X means that (2): F is V -uniform and that M,X [F/v] |= χ
∗.
By inductive hypothesis, we have (3): M,X [F/v] |= χ. The statements (1), (2)
and (3) are the semantical conditions for asserting that M,X |= (Qv/V )χ.
So, each Engstro¨m quantifier Q is equivalent to some team quantifier Eˆ(Q)
which is existential and monotone in the team-theoretical sense; the informed
reader can probably see the analogy between this operator E and the so-
called existential lift which can be used to produce a determiner with a collec-
tive reading starting from a determiner with distributive reading (Scha, 1981;
Van der Does, 1993).
In case 1) the Engstro¨m quantifier Qv is monotone (in the first-order sense),
and 2) the formula ψ to which Q is applied is flat, the meaning of the formula
Qvψ (or its equivalent E(Q)vψ) coincides with that of its first-order equivalent
(where Q is interpreted as a Mostowski quantifier), in the sense that, for all M
and X :
M,X |= Qvψ ⇐⇒ for all s ∈ X, M, s |= Qvψ
(on the left we have team semantics with the clause of Engstro¨m, on the right
Tarskian semantics with the clause of Mostowski). The following example shows
what goes wrong if either 1) or 2) is not satisfied.
Example 6.3. 1) Let us consider the “most” quantifier of Sevenster (2014),
which is monotone (in the first-order sense). For simplicity, consider just an
occurrence of this quantifier at the beginning of a sentence. Thinking in the
framework of team quantifiers, the proper interpretation of M, {∅} |= most yψ in
IF logic is that “there is a set (of ys), containing most elements of M , such that
ψ holds of this set” (not on this set, which would mean that ψ holds of each single
element in the set; we are treating ψ as a global, or collective, property of the
set). If ψ is a flat IF formula (of one free variable), this assertion is equivalent
to “ψ holds of most ys”. The reason is simply that the semantical clause of
Engstro¨m tells us that there is a set that contains most elements of dom(M)
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and that satisfies ψ; flatness tells us that each element of that set satisfies ψ;
and by monotonicity then the set of all individuals which satisfy ψ is a set
containing most of the elements of dom(M) (the converse is straightforward).
Instead, for formulas that are not flat, it simply makes no sense to say that “ψ
holds for most elements”, and we see no clear way to compare the behavior of this
“most” quantifier in this context with the classical behaviour of its Mostowskian
counterpart.
2) Consider the quantifier ∃≤2, such that ∃M≤2 is the set of at-most-two-
element subsets of M . It is not upwards monotone; we can see now that, if a
quantifier is not upwards monotone, the interpretation of sentences can easily
diverge from the intended first-order meaning, even when the quantifier is applied
to flat formulas. Indeed, ∃≤2 is clearly not the quantifier “there are at most two”;
this is because any sentence ∃≤2yψ, with ψ first-order, is trivially true in team
semantics (since ψ is satisfied by ∅, see Theorem 4.3). Thus, also its equivalent
team quantifier Eˆ(∃≤2) is trivial over FO, IF or DF logic.15
Similarly, the non-monotone quantifier ∃=2 (such that ∃M=2 is the set of two-
element subsets of M) does not have the classical interpretation. Let ψ be a
first-order formula of one free variable x. Clearly, according to team semantics
the sentence ∃=2xψ (resp. Eˆ(∃=2)) is satisfied in any domain where ψ applies to
at least two elements, and this is not the intended first-order meaning. When the
quantifier is sentence-initial, it does respect the second-order meaning (“there is
a set of 2-elements”).
We open a parenthesis in order to understand better the distinction we made
above between a property holding of a set, or instead on a set (collective vs.
distributive reading). We may consider an analogy with Aczel’s third-order
characterization of (first-order) sentence-initial generalized quantifiers (Aczel,
1975). Let us focus again on the case of a quantifier in sentence-initial position.
If P is a second-order unary predicate (applying to one variable for unary first-
order predicates), we can define the first-order generalized quantifier Q by a
third-order clause:
M |= Qzψ ⇔ (M,QM ) |= ∃S(P(S) ∧ ∀z(S(z)→ ψ(z))).
where (M,QM ) is a shorthand for the second -order structure which assigns the
local quantifier QM as interpretation for the second-order predicate P. This
clause combines Q with the on reading of ψ: ψ holds of every element of the
set X . How can we express instead the of reading, and thus the semantics of
Engstro¨m quantifiers? We just need to raise Aczel’s definition to a fourth-order
formula. Let Pˆ be a third order predicate applying to a second-order unary
predicate of the same type as the P above; then, one can define a quantifier
over sets as:
M |= Qzψ ⇔ (M, |Qˆ|M ) |= ∃P(Pˆ (P) ∧ ∀S(P(S)→ τψ(S))).
15The literature is not devoid of team-theoretical logics which do not satisfy the empty team
property; for example, such logics are obtained by extending FO, IF or DF with an operator
for contradictory negation. The interpretation of ∃≤2 and Eˆ(∃≤2) might not be trivial over
such logics.
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where (M, |Qˆ|M ) is the third order structure assigning, as interpretation for the
third-order predicate symbol Pˆ , the sentence-initial version of the local team
quantifier Qˆ = Eˆ(Q) (as defined in the previous section); and τψ(S) is the
translation, due to Hodges (1997b), of the IF formula ψ into an existential
second-order sentence with the extra predicate symbol S. (We cannot simply
write ψ(S), because an IF formula applies to individual variables, not vari-
ables for predicates). This equivalence captures the of meaning (ψ expresses
something about X , not about its elements).
Let us return to the analysis of the Engstro¨m quantifier. We have a fur-
ther argument against the restriction of such quantifiers to the monotone case;
it is a proof-theoretical observation. The point is that a good number of the
known inference rules of IF logic which involve existential quantifiers hold in
some similar form for Engstro¨m quantifiers; we analyze a number of these,
and their consequences, in the Appendix. The monotonicity restriction does
not affect any of the rules we examined; in other words, we could not find
any proof-theoretical discriminant between the monotone and the nonmono-
tone case. Similarly, on the semantical side, we saw (Theorem 4.4 and following
observations) that whether a generalized quantifier extension of a local logic
has the locality property or not does not dependend on monotonicity (the rel-
evant restriction is union closure, or, in the case of downward closed logics, no
restriction at all).
7 Capturing the non-monotone quantifiers
In the previous section, we saw that the monotone Engstro¨m quantifiers happen
to have the usual, first-order meaning whenever they are applied to first-order
formulas; and also, that this fails to be the case if the quantifier is non-monotone.
One may wonder whether there is some different notion of non-monotone quan-
tifier in team semantics which, when applied to a first-order formula, gives the
same results as would obtain by Tarskian semantics. Somewhat surprisingly, the
answer is yes. Engstro¨m gave a second semantical clause, meant to cover both
the monotone and non-monotone quantifiers. We briefly recall it; we will write
|=b (for “bounded”) for the satisfaction relation of extensions FOb(Q) , IF b(Q)
or DF b(Q) in which the generalized quantifiers are interpreted in this way. For
functions F, F ′ : X → ℘(M), write F ≤ F ′ if, for all s ∈ X , F (s) ⊆ F (s′).
Then, Engstro¨m’s semantical clause reads: M,X |=b Qxψ iff there is a function
F : X → ℘(M) such that
(1) M,X [F/x] |= ψ, and
(2) for each F ′ ≥ F , if M,X [F ′/x] |= ψ then for all s ∈ X : F ′(s) ∈
QM .16
This clause is successful in its purpose: 1) on monotone quantifiers, it gives the
same results as the previous definition (Engstro¨m, 2012, Prop.2.10), and 2) a
16Actually in Engstro¨m (2012) the second clause ends with “F (s) ∈ Q”, but reading the
paragraphs that follow, it becomes clear that the reference to F instead of F ′ is a typo.
22
FOb(Q) formula ψ is satisfied by a team X if and only if each assignment s ∈ X
satisfies ψ in the Mostowski sense (Engstro¨m, 2012, Prop.2.11).
However, the reader would probably not be surprised, at this point, to see
that even this more refined definition may fail to capture the intuitive first-order
reading of the quantifier when the quantifier itself is applied to an IF formula.
Example 7.1. Consider the quantifier ∃=ω such that ∃M=ω = {S ⊆ dom(M) | card(S) =
ω} (in the first-order reading, “there are countably (and not finitely) many”).
Now, since IF logic is capable of talking of bijections, we should expect to be ca-
pable of expressing, in IF (∃=ω), the concept C that “there are countably many
x that can appear in the domain of some injective function of codomain P”.
The mere existence of a bijection of the domain M with PM can be expressed
by the IF sentence
∀x∀y(∃u/{y})(∃v/{x, u})(x = y ↔ u = v ∧ P (u)).17
This can be most easily seen using the Skolemization procedure for IF sen-
tences (Mann et al., 2011, sec. 4.3). Treating u as a function of x (f(x)) and
v as g(y), the IF sentence is equivalent to the existential second-order sentence
∃f∃g∀x∀y(x = y ↔ f(x) = g(y) ∧ P (f(x))).
Indeed, x = y → f(x) = g(y) states that f and g denote the same function;
f(x) = g(y)→ x = y forces this function to be injective; by P (f(x))), the image
of the function is contained in PM .
So, it seems reasonable that the existence of countably many x that can be
in the domain of an injection in P be expressed by
ϕ : ∃=ωx∀y(∃u/{y})(∃v/{x, u})(x = y ↔ u = v ∧ P (u)).
If (M,PM ) is a structure of uncountable domain, with PM ⊂ dom(M) a
countable set, the statement C should be false (because there are uncountably
many such x: all x ∈ dom(M)). Yet, the formula ϕ is true in M . Indeed,
let F : {∅} → dom(M) be any function such that card(F (∅)) = ω; fix a bi-
jection g : F (∅) → PM and an element a ∈ PM and let J : {∅}[FM/xy] →
℘(M) be J(s) := {g(s(x))}, if s(x) ∈ F (∅), and J(s) := a, otherwise. Sim-
ilarly, define K : {∅}[FMJ/xyu] → ℘(M) by K(s) := {g(s(y))}, if s(y) ∈
F (∅), and K(s) := a, otherwise. It should be clear that J is {y}-uniform, K
is {x, u}-uniform, and M, {∅}[FMJK/xyuv] |= (x = y ↔ u = v ∧ P (u));
the semantical clauses then yield M,X [F/x] |= ∀y(∃u/{y})(∃v/{x, u})(x =
y ↔ u = v ∧ P (u)). We still have to verify that the clause 2) of the se-
mantics of ∃=ω is true. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is
a function F ′ : {∅} → dom(M), such that F ′ ≥ F 18, card(F ′(∅)) > ω and
17In order to fit with our syntax, the subformula x = y ↔ u = v should be replaced by some
classical equivalent expressed in terms of ∧,∨ and negation of atoms, such as (x = y ∧ u =
v) ∨ (x 6= y ∧ u 6= v). Any such equivalent will do, thanks to the fact that this is a first-order
formula.
18Notice that the assumption F ′ ≥ F in the argument that follows.
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M,X [F ′/x] |= ∀y(∃u/{y})(∃v/{x, u})(x = y ↔ u = v ∧ P (u)). Then there
are functions J ′,K ′ such that M, {∅}[F ′MJ ′K ′/xyuv] |= (x = y ↔ u =
v ∧ P (u)). But M, {∅}[F ′MJ ′K ′/xyuv] |= x = y ↔ u = v entails that
card(
⋃
Im J ′) ≥ card(F ′(∅)) > ω. Instead, M, {∅}[F ′MJ ′K ′/xyuv] |= P (u)
entails that
⋃
Im J ′ ⊆ PM , so that card(
⋃
Im J ′) ≤ card(PM ) = ω, and we
have a contradiction. Therefore, if F ′ ≥ F andM, {∅}[F ′/x] |= ∀y(∃u/{y})(∃v/{x, u})(x =
y ↔ u = v ∧ P (u)), we have F ′(∅) ∈ ∃M=ω. We conclude that M |=
b ϕ.
The seemingly paradoxical nature of this result disappears as soon as we read
∃=ω in its team theoretical interpretation; then we can see that ϕ just states the
fact (true precisely in any domain such that card(PM ) = ω) that there are
countable sets that can be injected in PM , and no larger set can. It is the
collective, and not the distributive reading which is at work here.
The concept C is in general equivalent to the statement that both dom(M)
and PM are countably infinite. It must be remarked that we cannot expect to be
able to define the concept C in IF logic, because it is well-known that IF logic
(which has the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem property, and can express bijections) cannot
define the countability of a set. We might wonder whether it is possible at all to
express C in quantifier extensions of IF logic. We see no straightforward way
to do this by means of Engstro¨m quantifiers. But there is a team quantifier that
does the job. Consider the local team quantifier
QˆM,Xωset := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)
X
) | ∃F ∈ F∃s ∈ X(card(F (s)) = ω)
and ∀F ∈ F∀s ∈ X(card(F (s)) ≤ ω)}
Then C is captured by Qωsetv(v = v) ∧QωsetvP (v), as can be easily verified.
The example above shows that the interpretation of quantifiers is problem-
atic also with the semantics given by |=b. It is however straightforward to see
that these kinds of quantifiers, as those given by Engstro¨m’s earlier definition
(Theorem 6.2), are identifiable with appropriate team quantifiers, by means of
a different lift Bˆ : Q 7→ Bˆ(Q) (“bounded lift”).
Theorem 7.2. Let Q be an Engstro¨m quantifier, and consider the second-order
quantifier Bˆ(Q) given by the condition, for all domains M and teams X:
Bˆ(Q)M,X := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)X) | ∃F ∈ F∀s ∈ X(F (s) ∈ QM∧∀F ′ ≥ F (F ′ ∈ F⇒ F ′ ∈ QM ))}
Then, for every structure M , team X and ψ IF (Q∪ {Q}) formula,
M,X |=b ψ ⇐⇒ M,X |= ψ∗
where ψ∗ is the IF (Q)[Bˆ(Q)] formula obtained from ψ by replacing all occur-
rences of Q with Bˆ(Q). The same statement holds for extensions of DF logic,
or for formulas with occurrences of both slashed and backslashed quantifiers.
Proof. We give the argument for IF . We reason by induction on the syntax
of ψ; the significant case is ψ = (Qv/V )χ. Assume first that M,X |=b ψ.
Then there is a V -uniform function F : X → QM such that 1) M,X |=b χ,
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and 2) for all F ′ ≥ F s.t. M,X |=b χ, it holds that ∀s ∈ X(F ′(s) ∈ QM ).
By 1) and the inductive hypothesis, F ∈ [χ∗]v,VM,X . Suppose then that F
′ ≥ F
and F ′ ∈ [χ∗]v,VM,X . By the inductive hypothesis we have F
′ ∈ [χ]v,VM,X ; this,
together with 2) and F ′ ≥ F gives that, for all s ∈ X , F ′(s) ∈ QM . So
[χ∗]v,VM,X ∈ Bˆ(Q)
M,X , that is, M,X |= (Bˆ(Q)v/V )ψ.
The argument in the opposite direction is similar.
So, also the quantifiers interpreted according to Engstro¨m’s second definition
can be identified with appropriate team quantifiers. We wish to point out that
one of the reasons for the deviation of these quantifiers from first-order meanings
seems to be the fact that the condition F ′ ∈ F ⇒ F ′ ∈ QM is applied only to
functions F ′ ≥ F ; it would seem reasonable to apply it to all functions. We may
indeed try to build a counterexample in which a formula of the form ∃=ωxψ is
true because there is a function F satisfying 1) and 2) (for the quantifier ∃=ω);
but at the same time there is a function G which satisfies 1) but not 2). This
means that there is a G′ ≥ G such that card(G′(∅)) > ω andM, {∅}[G′/x] |= ψ.
Let H be the function such that H(∅) = F (∅) ∪ G′(∅). Now, in case ψ is flat,
it immediately follows that M, {∅}[H/x] |= ψ; so H ≥ F and M,X [H/x], but
card(H(∅)) > ω: condition 2) is contradicted. However, if ψ is not flat, the
argument does not carry over; we build here a concrete counterexample.
Example 7.3. Let M = (dom(M), <) be a structure which interprets < as a
partial order such that 1) it has a minimum element a, 2) it has two max-
imal chains (linear suborders) ending, respectively, in maximal elements b1
and b2, and 3) the first maximal chain is infinitely countable, while the sec-
ond maximal chain is uncountable. Call C1 and C2 the sets of elements in
the first and, respectively, in the second chain. To make things easier, we
may also assume that C1 ∩ C2 = {a} is the only point in common. Now,
the property “R is a chain” is expressed in M by the first-order sentence (of
signature {<,R}) : ∀x∀y(R(x, y) ∨ R(y, x) ∨ x = y). And it is a downward
closed property: every subset of a linear order is a linear order. Then, The-
orem 4.9 of Kontinen & Va¨a¨na¨nen (2009) guarantees the existence of a for-
mula ψ(x, y) which is satisfied by a team X on M iff X(x, y) is a linear or-
der. Consider the formula ∃=ωx(∃y=ω/{x})ψ(x, y). The function F (∅) := C1
is such that: 1a) M, {∅}[FF/xy] |= ψ(x, y); 2a) for any function F ′ > F ,
M, {∅}[FF ′/xy] 6|= ψ(x, y) (let c ∈ C1 \ {aM} and d ∈ F ′(∅) \ F (∅); the sin-
gleton subteam {(x, c), (y, d)} does not satisfy ψ(x, y), and so by downward clo-
sure neither does {∅}[FF ′/xy]); 1b) M, {∅}[F/x] |= ∃=ωxψ(x, y) (by 1a and
2a); 2b) if F ′ > F , M, {∅}[F ′/x] 6|= ∃=ωxψ(x, y) (by a similar argument as
for 2a) ). Thus, M |= ∃=ωx(∃y=ω/{x})ψ(x, y). Notice however that also the
function G(∅) := C2 (which picks uncountably many elements) is such that
M, {∅}[G/x] |= (∃y=ω/{x})ψ(x, y) (by similar arguments).
The example reveals that the quantifier ∃=ω , interpreted according to |=
b,
respects the team-theoretical intuition that “there is a countable set” which
satisfies the subformula (∃y=ω/{x})ψ(x, y); but not the first-order intuition that
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”there are countably many elements” (the same formula can be satisfied using
uncountably many elements). If we eliminate the restriction F ′ ≥ F in condition
2), and redefine the bounded lift as
Bˆ′(Q)M,X := {F ∈ ℘(℘(M)X) | F 6= ∅ ∧ ∀F ′(F ′ ∈ F⇒ F ′ ∈ QM )}.
we obtain a notion of quantifier that comes closer to first-order intuitions, but is
more questionable from a team-theoretical perspective. The quantifier ∃ˆ=3,nm =
Bˆ′(∃=3), considered in example 5.2, has this form.
Finally, we contrast the behaviour of the semantical clause considered in
this section with Engstro¨m’s earlier one under the aspect of permutation of
quantifiers. Engstro¨m showed that, under |=b, generalized quantifiers may fail to
abide to some reasonable swapping rule, such as the equivalence of Qu(Q′v/{u})
with Q′v(Qu/{v}). Instead, in the Appendix we show that, save for some
trivial quantifiers, the permutation rules work correctly for quantifiers evaluated
according to Engstro¨m’s earlier clause, even in the nonmonotone case.
8 Conclusions
One of the main points which emerged from our analysis of Engstro¨m’s def-
initions of generalized quantifiers (his first definition, restricted to monotone
quantifiers; and the second clause for non-monotone ones) is that these must
be taken as a clever idea to embed the first-order generalized quantifiers of
Mostowski into team semantics; but the correctness of this embedding is lim-
ited to quantifiers applied to flat formulas. Since the typical logics based on
team semantics are not flat, the appropriateness of these quantifiers for logics
of imperfect information is difficult to assess.
Considerations over the higher-order nature of team semantics lead us to
conjecture that an appropriate notion of generalized quantifier for team seman-
tics should use semantical objects which are of higher order than those involved
in the semantics of the Mostowski quantifiers. We proposed such a definition
of “team quantifier”, which treats each quantifier as a set of sets of functions;
this definition includes, as special cases, the two definitions of Engstro¨m and
the Most quantifier of Durand et al. (2011). The identification of Engstro¨m
quantifiers with team quantifier is performed via two operators that we called,
respectively, the existential lift Eˆ and the bounded lift Bˆ.
Importantly, the existential lift is correct also in case it is applied to a quan-
tifier which is (from a first-order perspective) nonmonotone. Engstro¨m instead
stated that his first definition is not applicable to nonmonotone quantifiers.
Many of the arguments in this paper point to the fact that this restriction is
artificial, and induced by the mistake of treating a quantifier Eˆ(Q), which is
higher-order in content, as if it were a first-order quantifier. The quantifiers
Bˆ(Q) have been similarly misinterpreted.
We sketched some basic observations on team quantifiers, such as some dis-
cussion of their logicality. One obvious disadvantage of our definition is that it
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operates quite high in the type hierarchy (e.g. a team quantifier is a fourth-order
object), but still we think it is somewhat natural. This claim is supported, first,
by the arguments that lead us to this definition by analogy with the semantics
of Mostowski quantifiers; and secondly, by our observation that, for sentence-
initial quantifiers, our definition collapses to the more well-studied notion of
second-order quantifier, which treats the meaning of a 1-variable formula as a
set of sets – exactly as team semantics does, through the identification of a
1-variable team with a subset of the domain of discourse.
* * *
A Appendix: equivalence rules for IF ∗(R)
In section 6 we argued that there is no reason to restrict Engstro¨m’s first def-
inition of generalized quantifier to the monotone case. We further defend this
idea by showing that some good logical properties (in particular, prenex trans-
formations and the primality test) apply to extensions IF (R) without regard
for the monotonicity, or lack thereof, of the quantifiers in R.
It is sometimes easier to study the proof-theoretical aspects of IF logic if
one considers a more general syntax which also allows slashed connectives. We
follow the convention of Caicedo et al. (2009) in calling this system IF ∗ logic.
The syntax is obtained by replacing the clauses for conjunction and disjunction
of IF logic with the clauses ψ ∧/W χ and ψ ∨/W χ (where W is a finite set
of variables, ψ, χ IF ∗ formulas). All the other syntactical clauses must also
be extended to apply to ψ, χ IF ∗ formulas. The definition of the set of free
variables of an IF ∗ formula requires the additional clauses: FV (ψ ∧/W χ) =
FV (ψ∨/W χ) = FV (ψ)∪FV (χ)∪W . Finally, it is necessary to add two clauses
to the semantics. We say that a subset Y of a team X is W -uniform in X if
s ∈ Y , s′ ∈ X and s ∼W s′ imply that s′ ∈ Y . Then:
• M,X |= χ1 ∧/W χ2 if M,X |= χ1 and M,X |= χ2
• M,X |= χ1∨/W χ2 if there are Y, Z that areW -uniform subsets of X , and
such that Y ∪ Z = X , M,Y |= χ1, and M,Z |= χ2.
The IF ∗ language is a conservative extension of the IF language, provided
one identifies ∧/∅ with ∧ and ∨/∅ with ∨. Generalized quantifier extensions
IF ∗(R) are defined as in the case of IF logic (section 4). Remember that R
denotes a set of quantifiers distinct from ∀ and ∃.
In the following, we will prove the validity of several equivalence rules of
IF ∗(R); the reader can infer from each of them a corresponding rule for IF (R).
Our proofs will follow the model of Caicedo et al. (2009), although now we must
take care of the fact that functions from a team to ℘(M) are considered; and
of the strange things that may happen if some function has the empty set as
one of its values. (In the monotone case, the only quantifier which is affected
by this exception is the trivial quantifier TM = ℘(℘(M))).
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Further notational conventions
We list some additional notational conventions that will be used in this ap-
pendix. Most of them are borrowed from Caicedo et al. (2009).
• We omit union symbols in syntactical expressions, e.g. we write W ∪ {v}
as Wv.
• We write ψ/V for the IF
∗ formula which is obtained from ψ by adding
the variables of V to each of the slash sets (including the slash sets of
disjunctions). If V = {v}, we simply write ψ/v.
• Similarly, we write ψ|V (resp. ψ|v) for the IF
∗ formula which is obtained
from ψ by adding the variables of V (resp. the single variable v) to each
of the nonempty slash sets (including the slash sets of disjunctions).
• We denote by s[z/x] the assignment which is obtained replacing each ele-
ment of the form (x, a) with an element (z, a).
• We denote as X[z/x] the team {s[z/x]|s ∈ X}.
• We denote by ψ[z/x] the formula obtained from ψ by replacing each free
occurrence of x with z.
• If χ is an occurrence of a subformula of ψ, we denote as ψ(θ/χ) the formula
obtained replacing χ with θ in ψ.
• A team Xv is called a v-expansion of team X if v /∈ dom(X), dom(Xv) =
dom(X) ∪ {v} and (Xv)↾dom(X) = X .
We will state inference rules in terms of Z-equivalence19: given a finite set of
variables Z, two IF ∗ formulas ψ and χ are said to be Z-equivalent, in symbols
ψ ≡Z χ, if:
1) (FV (ψ) ∪ FV (χ)) ∩ Z = ∅
2) For all teams X such that dom(X)∩Z = ∅, and for any structure
M , M,X |= ψ ⇔M,X |= χ.20
The case with Z = ∅ is the usual notion of truth-equivalence.
Prenex form theorem
We move towards a prenex form result. First of all, we need a rule for the extrac-
tion of quantifiers in IF (R). We can reuse the proof scheme of the analogous
result for IF ∗ from Caicedo et al. (2009); but since that proof is based on many
19This notion of equivalence must not be confused with the alternative approach of “relative
equivalence” pursued in Mann et al. (2011), or with the special case of “safe equivalence” of
Dechesne (2005).
20Actually, the notion of Z-equivalence in Caicedo et al. (2009) also contains a requirement
about negative satisfiability. Since we have not introduced negative satisfiability in this paper,
we will ignore this aspect.
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intermediate results, we need to check carefully that the lemmas generalize to
our case.
Lemma A.1. (Caicedo et al., 2009, Lemma 7.4) Let V be a set of variables,
and v a variable not in V , s, t assignments of domain V and codomain M , and
W ⊆ V . Then
s ∼W t⇔ s(a/v) ∼Wv t(b/v)
for all a, b ∈M .
Lemma A.2. Let ϕ be an IF ∗(R) formula, X a team and v a variable not
occurring in ϕ nor in dom(X). Then, for any v-expansion Xv of X,
M,X |= ϕ⇐⇒M,Xv |= ϕ/v.
Proof. This can be proved by induction on the structure of ϕ. See Dechesne
(2005), 5.5 for an exhaustive treatment of cases, including slashed disjunctions.
The proof of the existential case can be taken as a model for the intermediate
quantifier case.
The following is the extraction rule we need. Remember that we use the
letter R to denote quantifiers distinct from ∀ and ∃ (“intermediate” quantifiers).
Lemma A.3. For any formulas ψ, χ of IF ∗(R), any variable v not occurring
in χ, V nor W , and Q being either ∀, ∃ or an intermediate R,
(Qv/V )ψ ∨/W χ ≡v (Qv/V )(ψ ∨/Wv χ/v)
Proof. For the cases Q = ∀, ∃ see the proof of Theorem 7.5 in Caicedo et al.
(2009). We examine the case Q = R. The requirements that v /∈ V ∪W and that
v does not occur in χ ensure that the non-triviality condition for v-equivalence
is respected.
⇒) This part of the proof does not differ significantly from the corresponding
existential case in Caicedo et al. (2009), Theorem 7.5, so we omit it.
⇐) Suppose M,X |= (Rv/V )(ψ ∨/Wv χ/v) for some team X such that v /∈
dom(X). Then M,Y1 |= ψ and M,Y2 |= χ/v, where the Yi are Wv-uniform
and Y1 ∪ Y2 = X [F/v] for some V -uniform function F : X → R
M . Now let
s ∈ Yi, s′ ∈ X [F/v] and s ∼v s′. This obviously implies s ∼Wv s′. So, by
Wv-uniformity of Yi, s
′ ∈ Yi. Consequently, Yi = Xi[F/v] for some Xi ⊆ X .
Thus M,X1[F/v] |= ψ (from which it follows that M,X1 |= (Rv/V )ψ) and,
thanks to Lemma A.2 (which is applicable since v /∈ dom(X)), M,X2 |= χ.
Clearly X1 ∪ X2 = X , otherwise the Yi would not cover X [F/v]. We check
that the Xi are W -uniform. Suppose s ∈ Xi, t ∈ X, s ∼W t. Then, by lemma
A.1, s(F (s)/v) ∼Wv t(F (t)/v); so, by Wv-uniformity of Yi, t(F (t)/v) ∈ Yi. So,
t ∈ Xi. We may conclude that M,X |= (Rv/V )ψ ∨/W χ.
The following basic result holds as usual:
29
Lemma A.4 (Interchanging free variables). If x /∈ Bound(ψ) and z does not
occur in ψ, then for any structure M and any suitable team X such that x ∈
dom(X) and z /∈ dom(X),
M,X |= ψ ⇐⇒M,X[z/x] |= ψ[z/x].
Theorem A.5. Let z be a variable not occurring in (Qx/X)ψ, where Q is
either ∀, ∃ or Ri. Then:
a) If x does not occur bound in ψ and does not occur in X, then
(Qx/X)ψ ≡xz (Qz/X)ψ[z/x]
b) If x does not occur bound in ψ, then
(Qx/X)ψ ≡z (Qz/X)(ψ[z/x]/{x})
Proof. a-b) The proof of Mann et al. (2011), Theorem 5.37, applies almost with-
out changes.
The notions of regular21 and strongly regular formula from Caicedo et al.
(2009) are also sensible in our context.
Definition A.6. An IF ∗(R) formula ψ is regular if:
1) No variable occurs both bound and free in ψ
2) No quantifier over a variable, say v, occurs in the scope of another quantifier
over v.
An IF ∗(R) formula ψ is strongly regular if each variable is quantified at
most once in it.
Lemma A.7. Let ϕ and ϕ(χ/ψ) be regular IF ∗(R) formulas. If ψ ≡V χ, then
ϕ ≡V ϕ(χ/ψ)
Proof. One can use the proof of Theorem 9.6 in Caicedo et al. (2009), checking
that the lemmas it depends on (6.14, 6.16, and our A.4) and their proofs are
also valid for IF ∗(R).
Theorem A.8 (Strong regularization). Every IF (R) (resp. IF ∗(R)) formula
ψ is V -equivalent to a strongly regular IF (R) (resp. IF ∗(R)) formula ψ′, for
some set of variables V ⊆ Bound(ψ′); ψ′ can be chosen so that Bound(ψ) ∩
Bound(ψ′) = ∅.
Proof. The proofs of 9.3 and 9.4 from Caicedo et al. (2009) still work, using
Theorem A.5 and A.7
Theorem A.9 (Prenex normal form theorem). Every IF (R) (resp. IF ∗(R))
formula is ∅-equivalent to a strongly regular IF (R) (resp. IF ∗(R)) formula in
prenex normal form.
21Not to be confused with the homonym notion from Mann et al. (2011).
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Proof. It can be proven as in Caicedo et al. (2009), 10.1, finding first a strongly
regular equivalent (Theorem A.8) and then using renaming (Theorem A.5) and
quantifier extraction (Theorem A.3).
Strong extraction rule
The prenex normal form theorem does not exhaust the discourse about prenex
transformations. As observed in Caicedo et al. (2009), the (weak) extraction
rule that we gave above is somewhat unsatisfactory, in that it does not yield as
a special case the quantifier extraction rule of first order logic. We want to show
that a strong extraction rule – analogous to Caicedo et al. (2009), Theorem 8.3
– can still be obtained for Engstro¨m quantifiers.
To make it work in the IF ∗(R) case, we need some tools for eliminating vari-
ables from singleton slash sets of slashed disjunctions. The following somewhat
unintuitive rule is similar (but less general) to an analogous (and as unintuitive)
result for ∀, Lemma 8.2 of Caicedo et al. (2009); the proof is a bit more involved.
Lemma A.10. Let ψ, χ be IF ∗(R) formulas, and v a variable not occurring in
χ nor V . Then, for any intermediate quantifier R ∈ R,
(Rv/V )(ψ ∨/v χ/v) ≡v (Rv/V )(ψ ∨ χ/v).
Proof. The condition v /∈ V ensures the non-triviality of the equivalence rela-
tion.
For the left-to-right implication, just notice that any v-uniform partition of
a team is also a partition (without further specifications).
From right to left. We have M,X [F/v] |= (ψ ∨ χ/v), where F is a V -
uniform function X → RM and v /∈ dom(X). Then there are teams Y1, Y2
such that X [F/v] = Y1 ∪ Y2 and M,Y1 |= ψ,M, Y2 |= χ/v. By Lemma A.2,
M, (Y2)−v |= χ. Notice that, since v /∈ dom(X), (Y2)−v ⊆ X . So we can expand
the domain again using A.2: if F ′ is the restriction of F to (Y2)−v, we have
M, (Y2)−v[F
′/v] |= χ/v. Clearly Y2 ⊆ (Y2)−v[F
′/v] ⊆ X [F/v]. We want to
show that (Y2)−v[F
′/v] is v-uniform in X [F/v]. Let s(a/v) ∼v t(b/v), where
s ∈ (Y2)−v, t ∈ X, a ∈ F ′(s), b ∈ F (t). Since v /∈ dom(s) = dom(t), then
s(a/v) ∼v t(b/v) implies s = t (this is an almost trivial case of lemma A.1).
So, b ∈ F (s). Thus t(b/v) = s(b/v) ∈ (Y2)−v[F ′/v], and we have proved that
(Y2)−v[F
′/v] is v-uniform. Thus, also the complement X [F/v] \ (Y2)−v[F ′/v]
is v-uniform. Since X [F/v] \ (Y2)−v[F ′/v] ⊆ Y1, by downward closure (4.2)
M,X [F/v] \ (Y2)−v[F
′/v] |= ψ. So, M,X [F/v] |= ψ ∨/v χ/v, and thus M,X |=
(Rv/V )(ψ ∨/v χ/v).
For a comparison, the above-mentioned result 8.2 of Caicedo et al. (2009) al-
lows transforming a disjunction of the form ∨/Wv, occurring immediately below
∀x, into ∨/W (in our version for R, W must be empty). For ∃ there is a rather
different property which allows the transformation of ∨/Wv into ∨/W below an
existential quantifier (∃x/V ): it works under the hypotheses that W ⊆ V and
v /∈ V (8.1 of Caicedo et al. (2009)).
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In the following we use the notation ψ|v to denote the formula which is ob-
tained from ψ when one adds variable v to all the nonempty slash sets.
Lemma A.11. Let ψ be an IF ∗(R) formula without occurrences of variable v.
Then
ψ/v ≡ ψ|v.
Proof. From left to right, this can be easily proved by induction on the structure
of a formula (also thanks to the fact that the subformulas of ψ have no occurrence
of v).
Also the right-to-left implication can be proved by structural induction.
Most cases have been taken care of in the proof of Theorem 6.7 of Caicedo et al.
(2009). We just prove the case ψ = Ruχ, which is new, and the case ψ = ∃uχ,
which we believe has not been treated correctly in Caicedo et al. (2009).22
We begin with the latter. So, ψ|v is ∃uχ|v. IfM,X |= ψ|v (whereX is a team
whose domain contains FV (ψ|v) ∪ {v}) then there is a function F : X → ∃M
such that M,X [F/u] |= χ|v. By induction hypothesis, M,X [F/u] |= χ/v. By
Lemma A.2, M,X [F/u]−v |= χ. Now define a function G : X−v → ∃
M by
G(s) = F (s(as/v)), where as is a chosen element of M such that s(as/v) ∈ X .
Then X−v[G/u] ⊆ X [F/u]−v. By downward closure (4.2), M,X−v[G/u] |= χ.
So, M,X−v |= ∃uχ, and using Lemma A.2 again, M,X |= (∃uχ)/v.
R can be treated analogously, constructing a function G : X−v → RM from
a function F : X → RM . Just notice that, in case F (s(as/v)) 6= ∅ for some
s, we can define G(s) := F (s(as/v)); and in case no such value exists, define
G(s) := ∅. In the special case that F = ∅, we can just set G := ∅; the rest of
the arguments holds because all of the teams involved have the same domain
(the empty set of variables).
The following is the strong extraction rule:
Theorem A.12. Let R be a set of intermediate quantifiers. Let Q be either
∃, ∀ or Ri. Let ψ, χ be IF ∗(R) formulas, with v not occurring in χ nor in V .
Then
(Qv/V )ψ ∨ χ ≡v (Qv/V )(ψ ∨ χ|v).
Proof. The assertion v /∈ V guarantees that the nontriviality condition for v-
equivalence is respected.
By the weak extraction rule A.3, we have
(Qv/V )ψ ∨ χ ≡v (Qv/V )(ψ ∨/{v} χ/v).
Use the lemmas for the elimination of slashes under quantification – Lemma 8.1
of Caicedo et al. (2009) for ∃; Lemma 8.2 for ∀; our Lemma A.10 for R ∈ R –
to transform the rightmost formula into
(Qv/V )(ψ ∨ χ/v).
22The slashed cases (Qy/Y )χ|x are uninteresting, because by definition, if Y is nonempty,
(Qy/Y )χ|x)|x = (Qy/Y ∪ {x})χ|x, which by induction is equal to (Qy/Y ∪ {x})χ/x =
((Qy/Y )χ)/x).
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Finally, by Lemma A.11 and substitution of ∅-equivalent formulas (Caicedo et al.,
2009, Theorem 6.5.3), the rightmost formula becomes (up to ∅-equivalence):
(Qv/V )(ψ ∨ χ|v).
From this, the classical extraction rule immediately follows:
Corollary A.13. Let R be a set of intermediate quantifiers. Let Q be either
∃, ∀ or Ri. Let ψ, χ be FO(R) formulas (with empty slash sets), with v not
occurring in χ. Then
Qvψ ∨ χ ≡∅ Qv(ψ ∨ χ).
Proof. Since χ is in FO(R), χ|v = χ. So, by A.12, Qvψ ∨ χ ≡v Qv(ψ ∨ χ).
Since v is not a free variable of Qvψ ∨ χ nor Qv(ψ ∨ χ), and FO(R) is a local
logic, the thesis follows.
Primality test
Next we turn to the primality test (Sevenster, 2014, Theorem 18), which is a
rather general syntactical criterion for understanding whether a regular and
prenex IF (R) sentence is equivalent to some (unslashed) FO(R) sentence.
These kinds of criteria, even though they are just sufficient and not necessary,
are of interest, because it is known that the problem is undecidable already for
IF logic. There is no need to enter here into the details of the criterion; suffice
it to say that it was proven for the “most” quantifier, in Sevenster (2014), using
only three equivalence rules:
1) Swapping mutually independent quantifiers
2) Making slash sets empty, whenever they only contain existentially quantified
variables
3) Making the slash sets of universal quantifiers empty23.
So, we just need to prove that these rules hold in IF (R) to obtain the
primality criterion. We do not manage to prove 1), and thus primality, for all
quantifiers: we have to add an (almost trivial) restriction.
Definition A.14. A quantifier Q is emptyset-free if, for every structure M ,
∅ /∈ QM .
Theorem A.15 (Swapping independent quantifiers). Let R be intermediate
quantifiers, and Ri, Rj ∈ R emptyset-free. Suppose u, v are two distinct vari-
ables. Then, for any IF (R) formula ψ:
a) (Riu/U)(Rjv/V u)ψ ≡uv (Rjv/V )(Riu/Uv)ψ
b) (∃v/V )(Rju/Uv)ψ ≡uv (Rju/U)(∃v/V u)ψ.
In case Ri is not emptyset-free, we still have (with self-explaining notations):
23Always possible when only truth, and not falsity is considered; this has been our approach
in the whole paper.
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a’) (Riv/V )(Rju/Uv)ψ |=uv Rju(Riv/V u)
a”) (Rju/U)(Riv/V u)ψ |=uv (Riv/V )(Rju/Uv)ψ
b’) (Rju/U)(∃v/V u)ψ |=uv (∃v/V )(Rju/Uv)ψ
b”) (∃v/V )(Rju/Uv)ψ |=uv Rju(∃v/V u)ψ
Proof. a,a’,a”) From left to right. Suppose M,X |= (Riu/U)(Rjv/V u)ψ, with
u, v /∈ dom(X). Then there are a U -uniform function F : X → RMi and a
V u-uniform function G : X [F/u]→ RMj such that M,X [F,G/u, v] |= ψ.
Define a function G∗ : X → RMj by
G∗(s) =
⋃
{G(s(a/u))|a ∈ F (s)}.
Since G is V u-uniform, G(s(a/u)) = G(s(b/u)) for any a, b ∈ M . So in
reality G∗(s) = G(s(a/u)) ∈ RMj for any a ∈ F (s); or, in the special case that
G = ∅, G∗ = ∅. In case ∅ /∈ RMj , one can also prove that G
∗ is a V -uniform
function. Indeed, suppose s ∼V s′. Since G is V u-uniform then G(s(a/u)) =
G(s′(b/u)) for all a, b ∈ M ; and since ∅ /∈ RMi , there exist a ∈ F (s) and
b ∈ F (s′). Thus G∗(s) = G(s(a/u)) = G(s′(b/u)) = G∗(s′), where a ∈ F (s)
and b ∈ F (s′).
Define then a function F ∗ : X [G∗/v] → RMi by F
∗(s) = F (s−v). This is
well defined because v /∈ dom(X), so that s−v ∈ X . Suppose s ∼Uv s′. Then
s−v ∼U s′−v, so by the U -uniformity of F , F
∗(s) = F (s−v) = F (s
′
−v) = F
∗(s′).
Thus F ∗ is Uv-uniform. One may check that X [G∗, F ∗/v, u] = X [F,G/u, v].
So M,X |= (Rjv/V )(Riu/Uv)ψ. From right to left one may use the same
argument.
b,b’,b”) The same proof method can be applied.
This result is in contrast with the counterexample given in Engstro¨m (2012),
sect.2.2, that falsifies the equivalence M,X |=b ∃=1x(∃y/x)ψ ⇔ M,X |=b
∃y(∃=1x/y)ψ and shows the failure (even for emptyset-free quantifiers) of quan-
tifier swapping under Engstro¨m’s second semantical clause.
Lemma A.16. Suppose in the IF ∗(R) formula ϕ there is an occurrence of a
quantifier (Qv/V ), where V contains only existentially quantified variables. Let
ϕ′ be obtained from ϕ by replacing V with the empty set. Then ϕ ≡ ϕ′.
Proof. We can observe that the proof of the analogous result for prefixes (of
IF logic plus the “most” quantifier) given in Sevenster (2014), Lemma 12, still
works. One only has to add the observation that the act of splitting teams
when disjunctions are analysed preserves the property that each assignment
in the team is uniquely determined by the values it assigns to universally and
R-quantified variables.
A last, obvious generalization is the following:
Lemma A.17. Every IF ∗(R) formula of the form (∀v/V )ψ is truth-equivalent
to ∀vψ. Every IF ∗(R) formula of the form (ψ1 ∧/W ψ2) is truth equivalent to
(ψ1 ∧ ψ2).
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The three last results, when restricted to IF (R), justify the primality test
for such logics.
References
Aczel, P. (1975). Quantifiers, games and inductive definitions. In Kanger, S.,
editor, Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, Volume 82 of
Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, pp. 114. North-Holland
Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Oxford, and American Elsevier Pub-
lishing Company, Inc., New York.
Andersson, A. (2002). On second-order generalized quantifiers and finite struc-
tures. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 115(1), 1 – 32.
Barbero, F., & Sandu, G. (2018). Interventionist counterfactuals on causal
teams. In Proceedings 3nd International Workshop on Causal Reasoning for
Embedded and safety-critical Systems Technologies, to appear.
Burtschick, H.-J., & Vollmer, H. (1998). Lindstro¨m quantifiers and leaf lan-
guage definability. International Journal of Foundations of Computer Sci-
ence 09(03), 277–294.
Caicedo, X., Dechesne, F., & Janssen, T. M. V. (2009). Equivalence and quanti-
fier rules for logic with imperfect information. Logic Journal of the IGPL 17,
91–129.
Dechesne, F. (2005). Game, Set, Maths: Formal investigations into logic with
imperfect information. Ph. D. thesis, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Van der Does, J. (1993). Sums and quantifiers. Linguistics and Philoso-
phy 16(5), 509–550.
Durand, A., Ebbing, J., Kontinen, J., & Vollmer, H. (2011). Dependence logic
with a majority quantifier . In Chakraborty, S. & Kumar, A., editors, IARCS
Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical
Computer Science (FSTTCS 2011), Volume 13 of Leibniz International Pro-
ceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Dagstuhl, Germany, pp. 252–263. Schloss
Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik.
Durand, A., Ebbing, J., Kontinen, J., & Vollmer, H. (2015). Dependence logic
with a majority quantifier. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24,
289305.
Durand, A., Hannula, M., Kontinen, J., Meier, A., & Virtema, J. (2016). Ap-
proximation and dependence via multiteam semantics. In Proceedings of the
9th International Symposium on Foundations of Information and Knowledge
Systems, Volume LNCS 9616, pp. 271–291. Springer.
35
Engstro¨m, F. (2012). Generalized quantifiers in Dependence Logic. Journal of
Logic, Language and Information 21, 299–324.
Engstro¨m, F., & Kontinen, J. (2013). Characterizing quantifier extensions of
dependence logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 78 (1), 307–316.
Engstro¨m, F., Kontinen, J., & Va¨a¨na¨nen, J. (2013). Dependence logic with
generalized quantifiers: Axiomatizations. In Logic, Language, Information,
and Computation 20th International Workshop, WoLLIC 2013, Darmstadt,
Germany, Volume 8071, pp. 138–152. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Galliani, P. (2012). Inclusion and exclusion dependencies in team semantics
- on some logics of imperfect information. Annals of Pure and Applied
Logic 163(1), 68–84.
Galliani, P. (2013). Epistemic operators in Dependence Logic. Studia Log-
ica 101, 367–397.
Gra¨del, E., & Va¨a¨na¨nen, J. (2013). Dependence and independence. Studia
Logica 101, 399–410.
Henkin, L. (1961). Some remarks on infinitely long formulas. In Infinitistic
methods, Oxford-London-New York-Paris, pp. 167–183. Pergamon Press.
Hintikka, J., & Sandu, G. (1989). Informational independence as a semantical
phenomenon. In Fenstad et al, J. E., editor, Logic, Methodology and Philos-
ophy of Science VIII, pp. 571–589. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Hodges, W. (1997a). Compositional semantics for a language of imperfect in-
formation. Logic Journal of the IGPL 5, 539–563.
Hodges, W. (1997b). Some strange quantifiers. In Mycielski, J., Rozenberg, G.,
& Salomaa, A., editors, Structures in Logic and Computer Science. Lecture
Notes in Computer Sci. vol.1261, pp. 51–65. Springer-Verlag London, UK.
Hyttinen, T., Paolini, G., & Va¨a¨na¨nen, J. (2015). Quantum team logic and
bell’s inequalities. Review of Symbolic Logic 08(04), 722–742.
Kontinen, J. (2010). Definability of second order generalized quantifiers. Archive
for Mathematical Logic 49(3), 379–398.
Kontinen, J., & Va¨a¨na¨nen, J. (2009). On definability in dependence logic.
Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (3), 317–332.
Lindstro¨m, P. (1966). First order predicate logic with generalized quantifiers.
Theoria 32, 186–195.
Mann, A. L., Sandu, G., & Sevenster, M. (2011). Independence-Friendly Logic
- a Game-Theoretic Approach, Volume 386 of London Mathematical Society
lecture note series. Cambridge University Press.
36
Mostowski, A. (1957). On a generalization of quantifiers. Fundamenta Mathe-
maticae 44(2), 12–36.
Peters, S., & Westerst˚ahl, D. (2006). Quantifiers in language and logic. Oxford
University Press.
Sandu, G. (1993). On the logic of informational independence and its applica-
tions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22, 29–60.
Scha, R. (1981). Distributive, collective and cumulative quantification. In Groe-
nendijk, J. A. G., Janssen, T. M. V., & Stokhof, M. B. J., editors, Formal
Methods in the Study of Language, Part 2, pp. 483–512. Mathematisch Cen-
trum.
Sevenster, M. (2014). Dichotomy result for independence-friendly prefixes of
generalized quantifiers. The Journal of Symbolic Logic 79(04), 1224–1246.
Va¨a¨na¨nen, J. (2007). Dependence Logic: A New Approach to Independence
Friendly Logic, Volume 70 of London Mathematical Society Student Texts.
Cambridge University Press.
37
